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Understanding our emotions is both an old and intuitively
relevant pursuit. Darwin’s concern with emotions has been cited as
an impetus for more recent basic research regarding these essential
aspects of human existence (Ekman, 1992; Mayer, Salovey, &
Caruso, 2004). The research reported here follows in this tradition,
attempting to untangle the complex processes that explain why we
have, and more importantly, why we display emotions. We argue
that people effectively use emotive displays to communicate and
distinguish motive, with important implications for organizational
practices, and particularly for the second component of emotional
intelligence–interpretation of emotion. 
Although previous laboratory research on accuracy has shown
numerous biases in person perception, a small body of longitudinal
research in work organizations (e.g. Bray &  Howard, 1983; Howard
& Bray, 1989) suggests that the success of person perception based
practices (e.g. assessment centers and selection interviews) relies on
accurate judgments of target motivation. While this flies in the face
of considerable evidence suggesting humans are inaccurate in their
judgments of others (see Funder, 1987; Sawyer, 1966), the accurate
and nearly universal perception of emotion (Ekman, 1992; Russell,
1994) provides a viable counter-explanation. In the present study,
we examine the accuracy of human judgments of others’ motive
levels, and the extent to which these judgments may be based on
inferences drawn from emotive cues.
Judgmental accuracy
A substantial literature over the past several decades has called
into question the accuracy of person perception (Funder, 1987). In
particular, a host of heuristics and biases are thought to be
fundamental aspects of the way that people view and respond to
one another (see Cialdini, 1997 for a discussion). While there is
little doubt that biases and heuristics are integral to person
perception and social cognition, it is not always clear why or under
what conditions people are inclined to use, for example,
attributional biases (Harvey & Weary, 1985). It has been
suggested, however, that this «black box» of heuristics and biases
may be accounted for by mechanisms associated with innate
observer motive systems (Cialdini, 1997). What has not been
considered, is the possibility that innate target motive systems
may play a central role in person perception accuracy, as well.
Further confusing the issue is the problem of defining accuracy
(Kruglanski, 1989; Murphy & Cleveland, 1995; Sulsky & Balzer,
1988). Common to most operational definitions of accuracy is the
use of laboratory circumstances, without accounting for what
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Kruglanski refers to as «utility» accuracy— the comparison of
human judgments with later events of importance. This «criterion
problem» (Austin & Villanova, 1992) with accuracy is exacerbated
by findings showing impressive long term predictive accuracy of
human judgments in applied settings, such as assessment centers
(Howard & Bray, 1989) and job interviews (Dipboye & Gaugler,
1993). Such utility accuracy outside of laboratory conditions
suggests a need for broader definition of accuracy to include more
ecologically valid indicators (cf. Russell, 1994).
So, apart from this issue of operational definition, why the
difference in laboratory and field study findings? Several clues may
help to answer this question. First, a notable characteristic of
applied person perception settings is the evaluation of motive as a
basis for predictive accuracy (Bray & Howard, 1983; Jones &
Whitmore, 1995; London, 1997). Rather than evaluating accuracy
only in terms of «rational-cognitive» dimensions, such as decisions
about numbers of names (availability heuristic) and percentage of
votes cast (hindsight bias), these studies evaluated the accuracy of
observers’ judgments about motives, as well. In assessment
centers, in particular, assessees are observed by and interact with
observers in structured settings, after which ratings are made of
skills, abilities and motive dimensions. While skill and ability
dimensions have shown adequate predictive accuracy, the utility
accuracy of motive ratings has been more impressive, sometimes
predicting a broad range of behaviors over substantial time periods
(Bray & Howard, 1983; Jones & Whitmore, 1995).
A second set of clues for answering the question of why
motive-based person judgments may tend to be accurate comes
from the research on accuracy of emotion perception (Russell,
1994; Elfenbein, Mandal, & Ambady, 2004). Considerable
evidence (and controversy) has been amassed showing a cross-
cultural tendency to understand smiles as «happiness», frowns as
«anger» or «sadness», and so on. The universality hypothesis, as it
is called (see Russell, 1994 for a critique), is taken as evidence for
an innate human perceptual ability to recognize emotions. Nearly
universal agreement about whether a facial display represents a
particular emotion suggests an innate ability of humans to
recognize emotions. To the functionalist, the next question is what
purpose this serves. 
One answer to this comes from Lang’s evidence suggesting that
emotion is a derivative of motive, based on actor perceptions of
how their own desires (and fears) are being met, missed, avoided
or approached. For example, when a prospective buyer calls to tell
a salesperson s/he would like to buy the salesperson’s product, the
salesperson feels pleasure and likely smiles. If the call is to tell the
salesperson there is a problem or that the sale will not be made,
other emotions and probable expressions of emotion occur. 
Putting universality together with this «motive readiness»
hypothesis helps to explain why universality may occur. Given a
recognition of the same motivational meaning of emotional
displays by observers, it would make sense to expect that emotive
displays are social indicators used by observers to infer whether
desires are being met or thwarted and fears approached or avoided
(Jones & Rittman, 2002). Some research on brain function
supports this notion, as the same areas used to make sense of ones’
own emotions appear to be used in observing others’ emotions
(Adolphs, Damasio, Tranel, Cooper, & Damasio, 2000). Thus, for
example, a smile signals the approach of something desirable and
a frown the approach of something fearful for both the actor who
expresses them and the observer who perceives them.
Putting these clues together, it seems quite likely that accurate
person perception is based on motive inferences drawn from basic
emotional displays. The heuristics and biases that help to explain
inaccurate inferences regarding abilities, skills, or other
«acquired» proficiencies may therefore not apply when we see
emotional displays in others. For emotional displays, we appear to
be well-suited to make accurate judgments.
Hypotheses
We propose a first test of this idea that emotional displays serve
a signal function regarding motive. First, we will replicate and
extend the finding that emotions can be accurately evaluated.
Previous work in this area has typically asked observers to view
still photographs of target faces and make judgments about the
emotions expressed for each (Russell, 1994). In this study, we had
observers view videotapes of targets performing a simple task.
Targets were themselves naïve participants, and were asked to
indicate the emotions they experienced while performing the task
from a list of 27 emotions. Using a Signal Detection paradigm
(Swets, 1986), we hypothesized the following:
Hypothesis 1: Observers will rate emotions experienced by targets
with greater than chance accuracy
Most important to the present study, it was expected that
differences in target effort would be correctly noted by observers.
Half of the targets received manipulations to increase their
motivation levels (i.e. specific, challenging goals and monetary
incentives to perform well). Based on the arguments above, we
anticipated that observers would be able to correctly judge these
differences in motive level in the targets:
Hypothesis 2: Observers will correctly classify targets in terms of
targets’ levels of effort directed toward the task.
Finally, it was expected that motive judgments would be based
on emotions observed. Regardless of the accuracy of either of
these, it was thought that, at very least, people use emotive
expressions of others to infer motive:
Hypothesis 3: Observer judgments of target effort will be
predicted by observer perceptions of target emotion.
Methods
The methods used to test our hypotheses relied upon the
development of target stimulus materials and a protocol for
observer ratings. The stimulus materials, which will be
described in detail next, involved the videotaping of 11 students
attempting to build a tower under varying goal and incentive
conditions. Given the inherent lack of motivation associated
with this task, an effort was made to significantly affect motive
levels of some of these «target» participants. After selecting four
videotapes of targets based on manipulation check and
personality indicator information, a second group of 34
participants (observers) observed these four videotapes and
provided ratings of emotions expressed and motive level. This
second group of «observer» participants will be described
subsequent to the stimulus participants.
ROBERT G. JONES, MICHELLE CHOMIAK, ANDREA RITTMAN AND TERESA GREEN68
Stimulus material
Participants and materials
Target stimulus participants were 11 introductory psychology
students at a large Midwestern state university. Participants signed
up to participate in the research for extra credit. There were 5
males and 6 females, with an average age of 25 years. 
A tower construction task was used to elicit emotive responses.
This task involved using colored wooden blocks, available at most
toy stores, to build a tower. The task itself provided some feedback
(e.g. when a tower toppled), so no other attempts were made to
elicit emotional responses. 
A tower construction questionnaire was created to assess,
among other things, the participant’s effort in performing the task
and emotions felt during the task. Responses to this questionnaire
served as both manipulation check and accuracy stimuli.
Specifically, targets were asked to indicate how much effort they
had put into the task and tick emotions experienced while
performing the task. Effort self-ratings were used as one basis for
selecting among these participants as stimulus material actors.
Stimulus participants also completed an expressivity scale.
This self report scale (Gross & John, 1995) is intended to assess
people’s tendencies toward being more or less emotionally
expressive. We administered this to stimulus participants with the
possibility in mind that target expressivity might affect the
accuracy of observers’ judgments of effort and emotional display. 
Procedure
Participants signed up to participate individually at specified
times. Each participant was led to a room that had a video camera
situated cattycorner to where the participant would be performing the
task. The camera was not concealed. The participant was asked to sit
at a table where there was a box of assorted blocks. The experimenter
read the same script to each participant. Participants were randomly
assigned prior to the study to either a high or low motivation level
condition. In the high motivation condition, the participant was given
a goal to build the tower higher than 2.5 feet and a motivator that, if
this goal was met, the participant would be entered into a drawing for
a twenty dollar prize. In the low motivation condition, the participant
was just asked to build a tower, without mention of a specific,
difficult height or any prize for meeting this goal.
Each participant first filled out a consent form, then had seven
minutes to perform the tower building task. The experimenter left
the room during the task. Once the seven minutes were up, the
experimenter reentered the room and measured the tower.
Afterwards, the participant was asked to fill out questionnaires and
once again the experimenter left the room. Upon completion of the
questionnaires, the participants were debriefed and dismissed. All
participants were informed about the study and entered in the
twenty-dollar prize drawing.
Stimulus selection
Four videos were selected from the original eleven as stimuli for
the second phase of the study. The four videos were matched on
motivation condition and expressivity, with gender nested within
expressivity (both high self report expressives were female and low
self report expressives were male). That is, subjects in the high
motivation condition were used as «high» motivation target
stimulus people, and subjects in the low motivation condition were
chosen as low motivation target stimulus people. Three stimulus
participants were excluded based on incongruity between their self
report motivation level and their motivation level condition. That is,
these subjects reported low effort when they were in the high
motivation level condition or high effort in the low motivation level
condition. From the remaining eight people, the highest and lowest
on expressivity in each motivation condition were chosen as
stimulus targets. It should be noted that the overall t-test for the
effort manipulation check item was significant (high motivation M=
4.17, S= .75, low motivation level M= 3.2, S= .45, t= 2.5, p < .03,
df= 9). In each of the stimulus motivation conditions, one person
was a high expressive individual (both females), and the other low
expressive (both males), based on a median split of the expressivity
scale. All videotape vignettes were seven minutes in length.
Experiment
Participants 
Thirty-five students from introductory psychology classes
signed up to participate in the final study for course credit. There
were 12 males and 23 females. 
Procedure
Upon arrival, participants filled out an informed consent.
Participants viewed each of the stimulus videos in a random order
assigned to them individually and completed a set of
questionnaires about each stimulus participant after viewing each
video. Ratings of effort were made for each video, with the
statements «This individual tried hard to succeed at this task»
(rated on a 6-point scale, 1= strongly disagree, 6= strongly agree)
and «To what extent did the individual appear motivated to
perform the task well?» (1= not at all, 5= extremely motivated).
Once all the videos were viewed, participants also were asked to
rank the targets’ level of motivation.
Results
Hypothesis one stated that observers would correctly observe
emotions experienced by targets. Accuracy was operationalized as
the degree to which observers classified a list of 27 emotions for
each of four targets as having occurred or not occurred. That is,
stimulus targets’ self reports of emotions experienced and of
personality were used as «true scores» to which observers’
checklists of emotions and personality observed were compared. A
signal detection model (see figure 1) was used, and a χ2 comparing














Figure 1. Signal detection model of observer accuracy
random frequencies of hits, false alarms, misses, and «no calls»
with the actual frequencies of these same events was computed.
Compared with random classification (27 of each: hits, misses,
false alarms, and no calls across 108 observations), observers were
quite accurate (χ2= 31.76, df= 1, p<.001). Overall classification
accuracy (number of correct observations divided by total number
of observations M= .77, S= .05) and behavioral accuracy (correct
observations minus incorrect observations, M= 58.57, S= 10.65)
also indicated a fairly high degree of accuracy. These did not differ
significantly depending on target expressivity (t= 1.14, ns, for
classification accuracy; t= 1.3, ns, for behavioral accuracy).
Results for hypothesis two provided mixed support for the
notion that observers are able to distinguish high from low
motivation targets. Rankings results were highly supportive.
Correct classifications were cases where observers ranked the two
high motivation targets first or second and the two low motivation
targets third or fourth.  Observers correctly classified targets in
terms of levels of motivation in 74% of the possible ranking
events. Given a random expected value of 34 correct rankings per
observer across the four videotapes, the actual number of correct
rankings was significantly greater than would have happened by
chance alone (X2= 29.58, df= 1, p<.001). 
Effort ratings, on the other hand, did not provided strong
support for this hypothesis. Although all mean rating differences
were in the expected direction, individual ratings could not be
used in t-tests because of a complete lack of variance in ratings for
one of the high motivation targets (M= 6.0, S= 0). All observers
rated this person as highly motivated (6 on a 6-point scale). When
ratings were combined for the two high motivation targets (M=
5.86, S= .59) and compared with combined effort ratings for the
two low motivation targets (M= 4.5, S= 1.74), there was no
significant difference (t = .74, ns), partly because variances for the
two groupings in this combined analysis were significantly
different (F= 2.95, p<.05). 
Regression analysis was carried out to test the notion that the
emotions observers perceived in targets influenced their
judgments of target effort (hypothesis 3). For the three targets with
variance in effort ratings, a stepwise regression of effort ratings on
the emotion checklist yielded significant results. The range of R2
values (.15 to .24, all p<.02) demonstrated a relationship between
emotions perceived and effort evaluations. Likewise, motivation
ratings were predicted well by the emotion checklist (R2 range
from .22 to .63, all p<.01). For high motivation targets, the
emotions boredom, disappointment, discomfort, and relaxation
were entered as significant predictors (all betas negative). For low
motivation targets, negative beta predictors included intimidation,
relaxation, and boredom and positive predictor betas were
associated with pride, enthusiasm, interest, and happiness.
Discussion
Initial results provided support for our contention that motive
perception is something that even people unacquainted with one
another do well. Although effort ratings could not be adequately
evaluated to discover whether they were significantly influenced
by target motivation manipulations, effort rankings were
substantially correct. Emotion checklists were fairly accurate,
though not as accurate as has been found in studies looking only
at facial displays of emotion. Most importantly, consistent with the
notion that emotions are used to inform effort judgments,
regression analyses showed significant relationships between
emotion checklist items and effort and motivation ratings. Despite
the possible inaccuracy of our rating criteria, it does appear that
motive perception is strongly related to emotive perceptions.
However, this relationship requires much more elaboration, both
theoretically and empirically.
One possible substantive reason for the difference in findings
between effort ratings and effort rankings is that there may not
have been a great deal of difference in target effort levels. Thus,
absolute differences in ranking were more sensitive than the
relative differences in ratings. Given more powerful incentives
than the temporary «goals and incentives» manipulation in this
study, ratings might be more sensitive to differences in effort. 
By the same token, this study represented a very rigorous test
of the primary hypothesis. First, there probably were only slight
differences in effort elicited by the manipulation, since targets
themselves only reported a small mean difference (effect size).
Second, the observers were given a short time to view targets.
Third, targets and observers were completely unacquainted. All of
these factors (small observable differences, short viewing time,
lack of acquaintance) suggest that the study’s results need to be
replicated in more ecologically valid circumstances. We suspect
that stronger evidence for our central hypothesis will be found
outside the laboratory.
This study also represents an initial attempt to evaluate the
general hypothesis that emotional displays are used to infer
motives. This means that we took several factors for granted in
both definition and operation. Chief among these is our narrow
definition of motivation in terms of effort levels. Since motivation
can be described in many ways, including both level and direction
of effort, this is only a partial definition of the dependent variable.
Further work is needed, looking at emotion perception and
observer construal of direction of effort.
The model of emotive perception posited here has important
value for the understanding of emotional intelligence. Apart from
the popular fascination with its measurement and application, an
important body of basic theory and research by Salovey, Mayer
and their colleagues (Mayer et al., 2004; Brackett & Salovey,
2006) has done much to broaden our understanding of individual
differences. The results of this study advance our understanding of
two of the most pivotal dimensions of emotional intelligence.
Specifically, we focus on the ability to accurately perceive others’
emotions and make appropriate inferences regarding them. Our
picture, as is often the case in such research, somewhat
complicates matters, but we believe may advance our knowledge
regarding the realities of emotionally intelligent processes.
More specifically, with respect to the recent controversies
regarding emotional intelligence, our results strongly suggest that
the second dimension of EI—interpretation of emotional
displays—is dependent on the first—accurate perception of
emotions. This means that the first dimension may be non-
compensatory, such that inability to recognize emotions accurately
makes interpretation of underlying motive unlikely to be effective.
This is consistent with Mayer and Salovey’s notion that
alexithymia – the inability to perceive emotion—is an important
aspect of emotional intelligence (Salovey & Mayer, 1990). 
Several questions were not answered by this research. First, it
is unclear how accurate perception of emotion and accurate
perception of effort are related. While both were demonstrated
here, and regression showed a relationship between evaluations of
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each, we did not test the notion that it was emotion perception that
affected motive perception directly. In other words, results are
only correlational with regard to this question. A more thorough
definition of motivation in future research, with control over the
emotions expressed, may uncover more about the observed effects
in this study.
Implications for organizations
While laboratory support for one explanation for differences
between field and lab studies of motive perception appears ironic,
it also provides an important «ray of hope» for organizational
practice. If, in fact, it is the accurate perception of motive that
affects long term prediction, then personnel practices may be
improved substantially by exploiting this feature. We suggest that
training in one or more areas associated with motive and emotive
perception may be a valuable contribution to organizational
practices, including customer service and ratings-based selection
and performance management systems. In particular, assessment
center, interview, and 360-feedback programs may be enhanced by
a better understanding of the emotion-motivation «language» on
the part of raters. 
It may also be important for interpersonal skills training and
development of conflict resolution skills to understand emotional
messages about motive. For conflict resolution and customer
service, it may be that simply asking each other about the
motivational sources of emotional displays will prove a valuable
tool for resolving conflicts and satisfying customer needs.
Elaborating on our understanding of these relationships may be a
worthwhile endeavor.
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